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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, LO-
CALS NO. 222 and 976, for and on 
behalf of membership, 
Petitioners and Appellants 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ITS BOARD 
OF REVIEW, APPEALS REFEREE 
AND CLAIMS SUPERVISOR, INTER-
MOUNTAIN OPERATORS LEAGUE, 
ORANGE TRANSPORTATION 
COMPANY and INLAND FREIGHT 
LINES, Respondents and Appellees 
Case No. 8428 
Brief of Respondents and Appellees 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioners and appellants, local unions 222 and 976, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and 
Helpers of America, represent members of those two unions 
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who filed claims for benefits for the period commencing with 
the 19th day of May, 1955, and ending the 11th day of June, 
1955. These claimants were denied benefits because it was 
determined that their unemployment was due to a stoppage 
of work which existed because of a strike at the establishments 
of their employers which involved their grade, class, or group. 
The claimants, through their authorized representatives, the 
aforesaid local unions 222 and 976, filed a written appeal from 
this determination of the Department representative. The 
matter was duly heard by the Appeals Referee, who, on the 
26th day of July, 1955, affirmed the decision of the Department 
representative. Parties were notified of the Appeals Referee's 
decision, and on August 5 the said duly designated representa-
tives of the claimants, locals 222 and 976, filed an appeal 
with the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. On the 30th day of August, 1955, by a majority decision, 
the Board of Review upheld the decision of the Appeals 
Referee and the Department representative. The matter is now 
before this Court on a petition for review of the decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For a number of years truck companies operating in Utah 
and Idaho, including Interstate Motor Lines, Utah-Arizona 
Freight Lines, Garrett Freight Lines, Inc., Gallagher Freight 
Lines, Consolidated Freightways, Inc., Ringsby Truck Lines 
Co., Pacific Intermountain Express Co., Inland Freight Lines, 
and Orange Transportation had been organized into the Inter-
mountain Operators League, and as such had bargained for 
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the individual employers in labor negotiations with the four 
local unions of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, and Helpers of America (in Utah and Idaho). 
The Intermountain Operators League bargained as a unit for 
the employers and the teamsters bargained as a unit for their 
respective local members. 
As a result of the previous bargaining by these collective 
units, a Master Labor Agreement for the years 1952 to 1955 
had been negotiated. This agreement by its terms ended on 
May 1, 1955. On February 25, 1955, Mr. Fullmer H. Latter, 
Secretary-Treasurer of the Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers 
of America, local union 222, directed a letter to the Inter-
mountain Operators League in which he stated: ''In accordance 
with the terms and conditions of that certain Master Labor 
Agreement between our Local Union and your League dated 
May 1, 1952, and each of the Supplements and Addenda 
thereto, it is the desire of our Local Union to terminate said 
Agreements. We have authorized and instructed Joint Council 
#67 to compile our requests with the other Local Unions of 
the Joint Council and submit them to you as a proposal for 
modifications and changes to take the place of the present 
Agreement." (R 23). 
On February 28 (R 24) Mr. Latter informed the Inter-
mountain Operators League in writing that he had been 
authorized and instructed by the affiliates of the Joint Council 
to submit to the League certain enclosed proposed changes 
to take the place of the 1952-1955 Master Labor Agreement 
and Supplements and Addenda thereto. These proposals in-
cluded demands for a wage increase, improvement in some 
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working conditions, improvement in vacations, health, and 
welfare plans, a pension plan, and certain other improvements 
in the contract (R 46). 
On February 26 Mr. Louis H. Callister, on behalf of the 
Intermountain Operators League, notified the members of the 
union Joint Council that the League and the members thereof, 
as it pertained to a new agreement, wished to eliminate the 
paragraphs of the Line Wage Agreement Supplement (Utah-
Idaho Intrastate and Interstate) 1954-195 5 as follows: 
"Section 8. That portion which provides for additional 
compensation for mileage in excess of 250 miles. 
"Section 12. Eliminate this section entitled 'Check and 
Fuel Time.' 
"Section 19. Eliminate this section entitled 'Division 
Points.' " (R 26). 
On February 24, 1955, Mr. Callister, by letter, notified 
the members of the Joint Council that the Orange Transporta-
tion Company, Inc., desired to bargain as an individual and 
was willing to meet at any time convenient to the parties (R 25). 
It is indicated by the record that there was no reply by the 
unions or the Joint Council to this letter. 
Prior to May 1, 1955, the members of the Joint Council 
negotiated with the Intermountain Operators League at several 
meetings. As previously pointed out, the unions made demands 
and the League submitted counter proposals. Thereafter, meet-
ings were held in Los Angeles between the union representa-
tives and the employers of the eleven western states (R 44, 
64, and 65). 
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On or about May 17, 1955, Mr. Latter advised Mr. Cal-
lister by telephone that the unions were going to establish 
picket lines at the premises of the Pacific Intermountain Express 
Company and the Consolidated Freightways, Inc. At that time 
Mr. Callister advised him that a strike against one would be 
considered a strike against all. On May 19 picket lines were 
established at the premises of the aforementioned two em-
ployers (R 45 and 64). The unions informed the companies 
(other than Pacific Intermountain Express Company and Con-
solidated Freightways, Inc.) that on and after May 19 the 
members would continue to handle all the freight in transit 
and on the docks indefinitely (R 48). 
With possibly one or two exceptions, the employer mem-
bers of the Intermountain Operators League notified the unions 
on May 19, 20, and 21 that the workers (members of the 
unions) were being laid off and being put on a standby basis 
(R 54). Deliveries of freight in transit at all but the struck 
plants were completed (R 55). Some work, mainly the handling 
of government merchandise (explosives, etc.) was done by 
some union members through the week ending June 13, 1955 
(R 48) . The pickets at the two struck plants were obtained 
from volunteer members of the several unions and included 
workers whose employment was for employers other than the 
struck employers (R 56). 
Assisted by the Conciliation Division of the Department 
of Labor a Memorandum of Agreement was arrived at during 
the California meetings_ and submitted to the Utah-Idaho 
operators and the members of the unions. The members of the 
Operators League were advised through their representative 
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that there would be no differentiation between operators in that 
everybody would have tq accept the agreement negotiated in 
California, and in the event they didn't, there would be a 
picket line in front of them (R 65). 
The Orange Transportation Company and Inland Freight 
Lines informed the unions that they were unwilling to accept 
the Memorandum of Agreement, and on or about June 12, 
1955, picket lines were established at Inland and Orange. 
These pickets were withdrawn on June 19 (R 47). 
The record shows that companies operating in the eastern 
section of the United States or the Midwest out of Chicago 
had placed an embargo on freight coming into the West, with 
layoffs to take effect on or about May 1, and that there was 
a later embargo placed on the movement of freight immediately 
prior to May 19. There is nothing in the record to show that 
any of the claimants involved in this matter were unemployed 
prior to the strikes at P.I.E. and Consolidated Freightways 
due to those embargoes (R 45 and 49). 
The claimants in this case are employees of members of 
the Intermountain Operators League (whose places of business 
were not subjected to picketing) who were "laid off" at the 
time of, or immediately after, the commencement of the strike 
at the premises of the Pacific Intermountain Express Company 
and the Consolidated Freightways, Inc. There is no claim for 
benefits by the employees of the Pacific Intermountain Express 
Company, Consolidated Freightways, Inc., Orange Transpor-
tation Company, Inland Freight Lines, or Milne Freight Lines 
for the respective periods of the strikes at the premises of those 
companies. At the time of the hearing before the Appeals 
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Referee, the members of the Intermountain Operators League 
and the local unions had orally agreed to accept the Memo-
randum of Agreement terms which were reached in Los Angeles 
but had not yet signed an agreement (R 47). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIO:t'-J 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE SUPPORTED 
BY EVIDENCE. 
POINT TWO 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MADE FINDINGS 
OF FACTS REQUIRED TO DISQUALIFY CLAIMANTS 
FOR BENEFITS UNDER AND BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 
35-4-5 (d). 
SUBPOINT A 
THE CLAIMANTS' UNEMPLOYMENT WAS DUE 
TO A STOPPAGE OF WORK. 
SUBPOINT B 
THERE WAS A STOPPAGE OF WORK EXISTING 
BECAUSE OF A STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE, 
CLASS OR GROUP OF WORKERS OF THE CLAIMANTS 
HEREIN. 
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SUBPOINT C 
THERE WAS A STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE, 
CLASS OR GROUP OF WORKERS AT THE FACTORY 
OR ESTABLISHMENT WHERE CLAIMANTS ARE OR 
WERE LAST EMPLOYED. 
SUBPOINT D 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN 
APPLYING THE LAW IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSION 
AND DECISION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECISION 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE SUPPORTED 
BY EVIDENCE. 
Finding of Fact No. 3 (R 79) is supported by evidence 
in that the parties wanted certain changes in any operating 
agreement, which was to be effective after May 1, 1955. The 
finding was arrived at after due consideration of the exchanges 
of communications between the Joint Council and the Inter-
mountain Operators League. On February 28 (R 24) Mr. 
Latter, for the Council, informed the Intermountain Operators 
League in writing that he had been authorized and instructed 
by the affiliates of the Joint Council to submit to the League 
"certain proposed changes to take place of the 1952-1955 
Master Labor Agreement and Supplements and Addenda 
thereto." 
10 
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On February 26 Mr. Louis H. Callister, acting for the 
Intermountain Operators League, notified the members of the 
union Joint Council that the League wished the new agreement 
to eliminate certain paragraphs of the Line Wage Agreement 
Supplement (Utah-Idaho Intrastate and Interstate) 1954-
1955 (R 26). 
The referee did not find that the 1952-1955 Master Labor 
Agreement continued in force and effect after May 1, 1955. He 
did reasonably conclude that as a matter of practical fact both 
parties were, in effect, saying that they wanted a new agreement 
effective on or about May 1, 1955, which would include some 
and delete others of the provisions of the 1952-1955 Master 
Labor Agreement. 
After examining all of the evidence surrounding the 
relationship of the Orange Transportation Company, the 
referee reasonably concluded that although that company had 
expressed a desire to negotiate separately, it did not, in fact, 
accomplish its desires (Finding No. 5) (R 79). On February 
24 Mr. Callister notified the members of the Joint Council that 
the Orange Transportation Company, Inc., desired to bargain 
as an individual and was willing to meet at any time convenient 
to the parties (R 25). Nowhere in the record does it appear 
thta the letter of February 24, 1955, was answered by the 
unions or considered by the unions to have accomplished the 
purpose expressed by the letter. It appears to be obvious from 
the record that the unions considered and announced that all 
members of the Intermountain Operators League would be 
compelled to accept the same agreement which was ultimately 
to be reached, and that there would be no individual nego-
11 
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tiations with members which had as their purpose the changing 
of the terms of said agreement. 
The consequent strike which was called by the union at 
the operations of the Orange Transportation Company, the 
Inland Freight Lines, and the Milne Freight Lines was obviously 
for the purpose of compelling those three employers to accept 
the Memorandum of Agreement which applied uniformly to 
the other members of the Intermountain Operators League. 
The referee could not have reasonably concluded that there 
was a withdrawal in fact by the Orange Transportation Com-
pany from the joint negotiations. The mere statement of a 
desired withdrawal does not in any sense necessarily accomplish 
that desire. 
The referee in Finding No. 6 (R 79) properly found that 
the unions had informed the League that they intended to 
call a strike against Pacific Intermountain Express and the 
Consolidated Freightways, Inc. He also properly found that 
the League representative, Mr. Callister, informed the union 
representative, Mr. Latter, that the membership of the Inter-
mountain Operators League would consider that a strike against 
one member of the League was a strike against all members 
of the League. On or about May 17, 1955, Mr. Latter advised 
Mr. Callister by telephone that the unions were going to 
establish picket lines at the premises of the Pacific Intermoun-
tain Express and Consolidated Freightways, Inc., and, in fact, 
on May 19, picket lines were established at those premises 
(R 45 and 64). Mr. Callister testified that at the time of said 
telephone call he informed Mr. Latter that a strike against 
one would be considered a strike against all. 
12 
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There is no dispute over the fact that negotiations were 
moved to Los Angeles, California, and that the unions and 
employers of the eleven western states participated therein. 
The appellant contends that the sole reason for the strike 
against Pacific Intermountain Express and Consolidated 
Freightways, Inc., was over the insistence of those two com-
panies on the question of terminal changes. There is nothing 
in the record to show that the union at any time advised the 
members of the Intermountain Operators League, prior to the 
strike of May 19, that the unions' only remaining disputed 
issue was the issue of terminal change. It will be noted that 
the matter of terminal change, otherwise titled "division 
points," was one of the subjects in M~. Callister's letter of 
February 26 in which he set forth the paragraphs which the 
League desired to be eliminated (R 26). The issue of "division 
points" was only one of a number of issues which were in-
volved in the negotiations. At the time of the strike at Pacific 
Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways, the 
terms of the Memorandum of Agreement had not yet been 
referred to the unions or to the members of the Intermountain 
Operators League for approval. The issue of "division points" 
was the subject matter of the general demands in the same 
manner as were those dealing with wage increases, improve-
ments in working conditions, etc., and as such affected the 
entire membership of the unions and the entire membership of 
the Intermountain Operators League. The mere fact that there 
may have been more insistence on the part of the employers on 
this issue is immaterial. The appellants would certainly not 
argue that the issue of "division points" was one to be con-
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sidered separately and apart from the proposed new Master 
Agreement. 
The controlling factor in this case is that the strike at 
Pacific Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways 
was actually called to enforce union demands which were 
the subject of joint negotiation between the unions and the 
members of the League. 
In Finding No. 8 (R 79} the referee properly found that 
the unemployment of the claimants was due to the action of 
the employers. It must be noted that the layoffs by the em-
ployers took place coincident with the May 19 strike at Pacific 
Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways. It must 
also be noted that the periods covered by the claims for benefits 
in this case are with reference to the period which began on 
or about May 19, 1955. It is apparent that the members of 
the League in a concerted action laid off their workers in 
consideration of the fact that a strike against one was a strike 
against all. 
The referee's Finding No. 9 (R 80) appears to contain 
substantially the same statement of facts as is set forth by 
the appellants in their brief on Page 13 in their comments 
regarding the Findings of Paragraph 9. 
POINT TWO 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MADE FINDINGS 
OF FACTS REQUIRED TO DISQUALIFY CLAIMANTS 
FOR BENEFITS UNDER AND BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 
35-4-5(d). 
14 
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The referee in Finding No. 7 (R 79) found that the 
unemployment of the claimants in this matter was due to a 
stoppage of work. By means of Findings Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 7, 
the referee found that the stoppage of work existed because 
of a strike involving the grade, class, or group of workers 
of which the claimants were members. 
Specifically, the referee found in Finding No. 1 that the 
claimants were members of the teamster union belonging to 
local unions No. 222 and 976. In Finding No. 2, the referee 
found that in negotiating for the 1952-1955 Master Labor 
Agreement the several local unions bargained as a unit and 
that under the specific terms of that agreement they notified 
the members of the Operators League that they desired to 
terminate the Master Agreement effective May 1, and that 
they desired to negotiate for certain changes. Article XVII, 
"Term of Agrement" of the 1952-1955 Master Labor Agree-
ment provides: 
"This Agreement shall be in effect from and after 
May 1, 1952. This Agreement shall remain in effect 
until May 1, 1955, and thereafter until sixty. ( 60) days 
notice, in writing, shall be given to either party by the 
other of a desire to terminate, change or modify the 
terms therein. Such notice shall specify in detail the de-
sired changes and all matters not specifically referred to 
are automatically renewed. Negotiations shall be com-
menced within ten ( 10) days after such notice. Changes 
or modifications thereafter made shall be effective 
retroactively to May 1, 1955. 
"It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that 
supplemental agreements covered by the terms of this 
Master, open for negotiations and modifications of 
their terms, through proper channels or notifications, 
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are not subject to the arbitration provisions of this 
Master Agreement.'' 
The signatories to that agreement included the local 
teamsters unions who notified the Intermountain Operators 
League that they wished to terminate the agreement effective 
May 1 and negotiate for changes. 
The Joint Council for those unions entered into negotia-
tions on behalf of their entire membership with the Inter-
mountain Operators League. All of the claimants in this case 
were represented, therefore, for the purposes of negotiations 
by the Joint Council or, in other words, by the several locals 
operating jointly. All of the claimants, therefore, became in-
volved in any action taken by their representatives operating 
as a unit. 
The referee in his conclusion found that the unemployment 
of the claimants was due to a strike involving their grade, 
class, or group of workers at the factory or establishment where 
they were last employed. 
SUBPOINT A 
THE CLAIMANTS' UNEMPLOYMENT WAS DUE 
TO A STOPPAGE OF WORK. 
Section 3,5-4-5 (d), Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides: 
"5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or 
for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
·· (d) For any week in which it is found by the Com-
mission that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of 
16 
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work which exists because of a strike involving his 
grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or 
establishment at which he is or was last employed." 
The appellants in their brief at page 13 state: "The un-
employment of these claimants is because of the acts of the 
employers in putting out an embargo against business, and 
voluntarily closing down rather than to the lack of business 
or the effect of the strike" (Emphasis ours). And again on page 
21 of their brief, the appellants state: "Hence, the unemploy-
ment which existed from the 19th of May to the 12th of 
June, 1955, was due to the lack of business and voluntary sus-
pension of operations on the part of the employers." 
In discussing the meaning of the words "stoppage of 
work" in the Michigan unemployment act, the Court held: 
"Section 29 (c) of the 1936 Act disqualified an em-
ployee for benefits if his unemployment was 'due to 
a labor dispute ... actively in progress in the estab-
lishment.' The 1941 amendment of said section dis-
qualified an employee for benefits if his unemployment 
is 'due to a stoppage of work existing because of a 
labor dispute in the establishment.' 
"In making the 1941 amendment the legislature in-
tended to change the meaning of the existing law. The 
amendment was intended to disqualify an employee for 
benefits only when his unemployment resulted from 
a stoppage or substantial curtailment of the work and 
operations of the employer establishment because of 
a labor dispute. The phrase 'stoppage of work' refers 
to the work and operations of the employer establish-
ment and not to the work of the individual employee. 
"Hence, employees who were discharged when they 
stopped work and went on strike were held to be en-
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
titled to benefits where the employer's hiring of new 
employees prevented a stoppage of work, except for a 
period of about 15 minutes, from taking place because 
of the strike.-Lawrence Baking Co. v. Mich. UCC, 
308 Mich. 198, 13 N. W. {2d) 260 {1944) ". 
"Stoppage of work" is generally construed by the several 
state agencies to mean a complete or substantial curtailment 
of the work and operations of the employer. Only in a few 
cases is the work stoppage a complete stoppage due to the 
practical aspects of operating a business of any size. In most 
cases, it is necessary to maintain a limited crew of workers 
as maintenance employees to prevent the deterioration of the 
plant and equipment. In some cases, as in the instant case, 
there was a certain amount of what might be called emergency 
freight (government and otherwise) which necessarily had 
to be handled. The big bulk of the employees of the employers 
in question were laid off and a substantial, if not complete, 
work stoppage existed. 
It appears that the referee, the appellants, and the re-
spondents in this matter are agreed that there was a stoppage 
of work during the period for which the claimants were filing 
for unemployment compensation benefits. On this point, there 
remains the question as to whether or not the stoppage of work 
was caused by a strike involving the grade, class, or group 
to which the claimants belonged. 
SUBPOINT B 
THERE WAS A STOPPAGE OF WORK EXISTING 
BECAUSE OF A STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE, 
18 
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CLASS OR GROUP OF WORKERS OF THE CLAIMANTS 
HEREIN. 
The appellants tn their brief at page 26 state: "The 
stoppage of work which caused the unemployment of the 
claimants herein was not due to a strike, but to the planned, 
arbitrary, unilateral plan of the employers to lockout their 
employees." We agr~e that the claimants herein were unem-
ployed because they were laid off by their employers. 
The question presented herein is, "Did the strike at the 
Pacific Intermountaip. Express Company and the Consolidated 
Freightways, Inc., cause the unemployment of the claimants 
herein?" In the case of the Olof Nelson Construction Com-
pany vs. the Industrial Commission, 243 P 2d 951, the Utah 
Supreme Court ruled that in controversies where workers are 
represented by their unions arrayed on one side against man-
agement in multiple unit bargaining organizations on the 
other, the party to first use the weapon of its economic pressure 
against the other side is the one chargeable with the respon-
sibility of the work stoppage, and if a work stoppage occurs 
as a result of a strike by any of die employees for the benefit 
of all aimed at all the employers, then all of the employees 
are ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits under 
the provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act. In that 
case the Court stated: 
"Thus, the critical fact to be determined is whether 
the conduct of labor or management is the primary and 
initiating cause of the work stoppage, or as phrased by 
Mr. Justice Schauer in the McKinley case: · ... It was 
proper to relate responsibility for the work stoppage to 
the party who created its actual and directly impelling 
cause.' 
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"That brings us down to the 'brass tacks' of the 
situation in this case. There is no dispute about the 
fact that claimants were all members of the Six Basic 
Craft Unions and that the Building Trades Council was 
their collective bargaining representative; that they all 
belonged to the 'grade, class, or group' of workers 
whose wages were being bargained for. We thus have 
the Building Trade Council, representing the entire 
group of workers of all of these employers, aligned on 
one side of the controversy, and on the other side were 
all 75 members of A. G. C. who were also bound to-
gether as a collective bargaining unit; the Unions and 
the Association had established a long practice of 
bargaining as a unit; the 1949 contract between them 
was still in force at the time of the strike; by its terms 
the employees as a group had agreed to bargain col-
lectively with the A. G. C. representing all of the 
employers. The only dispute and the only negotiation 
between the parties was in regard to the wage scale 
for the entire group of workers and against the entire 
group of employers. There was no separate demand 
made, no dispute existed, and no separate negotiation 
was carried on or proposed with the Barker and Paul 
firms (the ones picketed) . Even after the strike was 
called, negotiations were continued between the Build-
ing Trades Council and the A. G. C. as a group. 
"Under the circumstances here shown, it is indis-
putable that, although this strike and picketing was 
actually carried on against two firms only, it was author-
ized by the Union as an economic weapon to put pres-
sure on all of the employers for the benefit of all of 
the employees with respect to negotiations of the 
master contract." 
In the instant case, we have a similar set of facts. The 
claimants in this case are all members of the teamsters locals 
which were bargaining with the Intermountain Operators 
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League through the Joint Council of the locals. They were 
bargaining for a new contract to commence May 1, 1955, and 
to include provisions beneficial to all of the claimants. There 
was no separate demand made and no separate negotiation 
was carried on or proposed with Pacific Intermountain Express 
and Consolidated Freightways, Inc., (the ones picketed.) Even 
after the strike was called, negotiations were continued for a 
Master Labor Agreement affecting the employers in the eleven 
western states, which, of course, included the employer mem-
bers of the Intermountain Operators League. 
As in the Olaf Nelson case the strike and picketing was 
actually carried on against two firms only. It was authorized 
by the union as an economic weapon to put pressure on all 
of the employers for the benefit of all the employees with 
respect to negotiation of the master contract. After the strike 
at Pacific Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freight-
ways, negotiation continued in Los Angeles and resulted tn 
a Memorandum of Agreement for a new master contract. 
The Court in the Olaf Nelson case, supra, stated: 
"Once the entire group of employers, A. G. C., be-
came bound in a contract for collective bargaining with 
the entire group of employees (Six Basic Crafts), then 
these two groups, insofar as their relationship to each 
other concerning bargaining for wages, hours and work 
conditions under the master contract was concerned, 
became as single units, one group to deal collectively 
with the other group. That is the negotiation which was 
being carried on and with respect to which the dispute 
arose which gave rise to the work stoppage we are 
concerned with. It is clear beyond a doubt that the 
Union was the collective bargaining representative of 
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these claimants; that it authorized and ordered this 
strike against the two employers as an economic weapon 
against all of the employers to force a wage increase 
for all of the workmen in the Six Basic Crafts; that 
the claimants were members of the 'grade, class or 
group' for whom the strike was called; that the strike 
was attended by success and that the claimants benefited 
therefrom along with the striking employees and all 
other workmen employed by the A. G. C." 
In the instant case, the entire group of employers, the 
Intermountain Operators League, became bound in a contract 
for collective bargaining with the entire group of employees, 
the teamsters. locals (Joint Council), and these two groups 
became as single units, one group to deal collectively with the 
other group. The union was the collective bargaining repre-
sentative of these claimants, and it authorized the strike at 
Pacific Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways 
as an economic weapop to bring about the successful negotiation 
of a new master labor agreement from which all members of 
the teamsters locals stood to benefit. Although the appellants 
contend that the sole issue in the strike against Pacific Inter-
mountain Express and Consolidated Freightways was the one 
involving the question of terminals or "division points" as 
defined in the Master Labor Agreement, it must be remembered 
that the issue of "division points" was raised immediately at 
the beginning of the negotiations between the Joint Council 
and the Intermountain Operators League at their first meetings 
concerning the subject matter of a new master agreement. 
There is no evidence in the record to indicate that at any par-
ticular point the union ceased to bargain with the employers 
as a collective unit and commenced bargaining with Pacific 
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Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways on the 
single issue of "division points." As a matter of fact the evi-
dence is all to the contrary. 
Since the major issue in the joint negotiations was that 
of the new Master Labor Agreement, the fact that the terminal 
or division point issue was of prime importance to the two 
aforementioned employers does not in any sense change the 
character of the relationships between the multiple bargaining 
unit of the employers and the multiple bargaining unit of the 
claimants. 
The appellants argue in their brief at pages 21, 26, and 
27: "The strike against P.I.E. and Consolidated did not force 
the other employers to cease operation, for the evidence is 
that there was ample freight for them to operate, and some 
Trucking Companies did operate during the time. In other 
words, the Employers were in direct competition with the struck 
companies for freight and the strike against P .I.E. and Con-
solidated would have greatly increased the amount of business 
for the remaining carriers, and enhanced their operations." 
This argument s~ems to indicate that the appellants are 
in agreement that the shutting down of operations by the em-
ployer members of the League (other than P .I.E. and Con-
solidated) was directly due to the strike which occurred at 
P.I.E. and Consolidated Freightways. As they pointed out, 
in effect, the equipment which had been running practically 
empty could have been used to a good advantage to carry 
the freight which would normally have been carried by Pacific 
Intermountain Express and Consolidated. The employers, how-
ever, chose to shut down their operations and lay off their 
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employees as a retaliation in response to the strike at Pacific 
Intermountain Express and Consolidated. 
There is considerable mention by the appellants in their 
brief of the two embargoes which were placed on the move-
ment of freight from the Middle West to the West and from 
the west coast eastward, but there is no direct evidence that 
total unemployment of any of these claimants was caused by 
these embargoes. There is evidence that the working hours 
of some of these individuals who later became claimants for 
the period commencing May 19 were reduced. There is also 
further evidence that much of the equipment of the employers 
involved in this matter was either returning empty or partially 
loaded. This evidence, of course, corroborates the position of 
the respondents herein that the employer shutdown oo May 
19 was due directly to the strike of that date. 
Further evidence that the strike at Pacific Intermountain 
Express and Consolidated Freightways involved the entire 
membership of the teamsters locals represented herein is con-
tained on page 56 of the record. At that point the union 
representative testified that the picketing was done by men who 
volunteered for such picketing and that these men came from 
the general membership of the unions and was not confined to 
those employees who normally worked at Pacific Intermountain 
Express and Consolidated Freightways. The testimony is that 
the picketing was not compulsory. It appears to us that there 
could be no surer way to involve the entire membership of 
several unions in a strike at the premises of one or more 
employers than the active participation by a cross section of 
the general membership of all the unions in the strike activities 
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(picketing) which took place at the struck plants. In this case 
we have members of the several local unions who were normally 
employed by employers whose plants were not "struck" or 
"picketed" actually performing picket duty on a scheduled 
basis at the premises where the strike had occurred. 
SUBPOINT C 
THERE WAS A STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE, 
CLASS OR GROUP OF WORKERS AT THE FACTORY 
OR ESTABLISHMENT WHERE CLAIMANTS ARE OR 
WERE LAST EMPLOYED. 
The appellants argue and quote numerous cases which 
define the words "plant" or "establishment" in support of 
their position that there was no strike at the plants or estab-
lishments of the claimants herein. We think the decision in 
the Olaf Nelson case, supra, as it defines "plant" or "establish-
ment" must prevail. In that case the Court said: 
"Our conclusion in this case is that the sounder view 
is to recognize these large scale bargaining units as 
the groups involved within the meaning of the Em-
ployment Security Act. Their number and scope are 
increasing. Both labor and management have seen fit 
to resort to such a device for a uniform, ~xpedient 
means of negotiating their agreements. There is no 
dispute that the economic sanction of the A. F. of L. 
in this case was directed against the entire employer 
association. The strike was called for and on behalf of 
every employee covered by the agreement. It therefore 
directly involved all these claimants, at each particular 
place of employment at which they were last employed. 
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The strike was fomented by claimants through their 
duly authorized union representatives. They are mem-
bers of the group which gained a raise in wages because 
of the strike and are parties to the scheme or plan to 
foment it. Therefore they are not entitled to unem-
ployment benefits. The order of the Industrial Com-
mission is reversed. Costs are awarded to the plaintiffs." 
(Emphasis ours) . 
The Court further said: 
"Inasmuch as claimants were members of the ·grade, 
class, or group' for whose benefits the strike was called: 
they were involved in the strike, and being so, they were 
involved wherever they were situated, including in 
their own plants or establishments . . . '' 
Industry-wide or area-wide bargaining was practically 
unknown at the time most of the state unemployment com-
pensation laws were passed. The problems of definition of 
terms which later arose due to the establishment of collective 
bargaining practices were not, therefore, apparent. It became 
necessary for the courts to determine the scope of the words 
"plant" or "establishment" in relation to the scope of the 
issues and parties involved in the cases arising out of these 
collective bargaining matters. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in effect, has in cases of mul-
tiple bargaining units extended the meaning of the words 
"plant" or "establishment" to include all of the places of 
work where workers for whom such bargaining is being car-
ried out perform their services. In the Olof Nelson case, supra, 
the Utah Supreme Court has quoted freely from the decision 
of the California Court in the case of McKinley vs. California 
Employment Stabilization Commission, 34 Cal. 2d 238, 209 
P 2d 602, and we quote: 
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"In McKinley vs. California Employment Stab. 
Comm., supra, the employer association comprised all 
of the Sacramento Machine Shop baking industry. The 
Bakery and Confectionary Worker's Union struck the 
Butter Cream Plant, a member of the association. The 
association carried out their prearranged plan of re-
taliating against the strike by an association-wide lock-
out. The California disqualification provision reads: 
'An individual is not eligible for benefits . . . (a) If 
he left his work because of a trade dispute and for the 
period during which he continues out of work by reason 
of the fact that the trade dispute is still in active prog-
ress in the establishment in which he was employed.' 
The court stated (page 606): 
" 'At no time did the union purport to be directing 
any action solely against the Butter Cream Plant; 
instead, the union continued throughout to deal di-
rectly with the association for the purpose of obtain-
ing a new master contract. To say, therefore, that the 
act of striking the one plant did not shut down work 
in other plants of the association which were subject 
to the labor negotiations for the purpose of obtaining 
a master contract is wholly unrealistic. Industry-wide 
negotiations had been established by these employers 
and consistently carried on for over 10 years.' 
"Other quotations which emphasize the California 
position are: 
" 'It seems clear that under such industry-wide 
single contract negotiation, economic action by either 
side, whether strike or lockout would be considered 
by each of the parties as action against the entire 
group struck or locked out . . . The selection of a 
certain plant or plants for a shutdown by strike at 
a particular time was a mere matter of strategy in 
the conduct of the trade dispute which equally in-
volved all of the bakeries and their employees. This, 
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in effect, applied the union's economic sanctions 
against each employer and brought about the un-
employment of all of its members. Had the associa-
tion acted first by closing down one of the members 
plants and the union followed with a strike against 
all of the remaining plants, it would be equally 
clear that the volitional act causing the unemploy-
ment was the initial shutdown.' 
"Thus, as Mr. Justice Schauer stated in his concurring 
opinion at page 608, the court held 'that it was proper 
to relate responsibility for the work stoppage to the 
party who created its actual and directly impelling 
cause.' " 
In the Olof Nelson case, supra, the Utah Court said: 
"Our conclusion is that the various disqualification 
provisions of our Employment Security Act reveal that 
the underlying legislative intent is for the commission 
to determine the claimant's eligibility by adhering to 
the volitional test as announced in the Bodinson, 
Bunn~'.s Waffle Shop and McKinley cases in California 
SUBPOINT D 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN 
APPLYING THE LAW IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSION 
AND DECISION. 
The appellants m their brief, Page 33, argue that this 
Court in the Olof Nelson case, supra, did not lay down a 
mandate that action taken against two of the group must be 
deemed to be action against the whole group and the claimants 
be denied benefits. We disagree. In this case, as in the Olof 
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Nelson case, there was an established pattern of collective 
bargaining between the Intermountain Operators League and 
the teamsters locals. This is further evidenced by the fact that 
there was in existence at the time this action started a Master 
Labor Agreement affecting the members of the League and the 
several locals involved herein. It is further evidenced by the 
fact that the announced and accomplished purpose of the 
collective bargaining at the time this instant matter arose was 
a new master agreement covering, for all intents and purposes, 
the same parties. The terms of the Master Labor Agreement 
1952-1955 also made it clear that the parties intended to bargain 
collectively either for changes in the old Master Labor Agree-
ment or for a new agreement. 
There certain! y can be no dispute but that such collective 
bargaining took place in this instance. The fact that, after the 
preliminary negotiations in Utah had occurred, the negotiations 
were then transferred to Los Angeles does not alter the picture. 
The plants in Utah which were struck (i.e., Pacific Inter-
mountain Express and Consolidated Freightways) were signa-
tories to the Utah Master Labor Agreement 1952-1955 as 
were the striking unions. 
The issues as originally developed in the early negotia-
tions in the State of Utah did, as we have previously pointed 
out, include the matter of "terminals" or, as defined in the 
Master Labor Agreement, "division points." The issue, there-
fore, of the matter of "division points" was within the scope 
of the negotiations as they were carried out from beginning 
to end. While there may have been more difficulty on the 
part of the unions in obtaining results they wanted with refer-
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ence to "division points," this does not make that issue any 
less a part of the subject matter involved in the area-wide ne-
gotiations. As a matter of fact, the record indicates that for 
all practical purposes all of the teamsters locals in the eleven 
western states became involved in the collective bargaining 
activities. The involvement of the claimants in the instant case 
is made much more definite by reason of the fact that the 
pickets performing picket duty at the struck plants were 
recruited from the general membership of the teamsters locals 
involved in the collective bargaining. This participation in the 
picketing by the general membership also involved all of the 
claimants in the strike. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we wish to point out that the instant case 
arising under similar facts and circumstances as those of the 
Olof Nelson case, supra, falls squarely within the volitional 
rule laid down by this court in that case. 
The decision of the Industrial Commission should, there-
fore, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
FRED F. DREMANN 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys fo1' Respondents and 
Appellees 
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